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Commercial Transactions
Commercial Transactions; industrial loan companies
Financial Code § 18170,18171,18172,18173,18174,18175
(new).
SB 1995 (Davis); 1992 STAT. Ch. 517
Existing law regulates industrial loan companies' incorporated
under California state law.2 Chapter 517 permits the Commissioner
of Corporations (Commissioner) 3 to authorize a state or federal
depository corporation4 to engage in the industrial loan business.5
Chapter 517 requires the Commissioner to investigate the state or
federal depository corporation.6
Existing law provides for the denial of an application to engage
in the industrial loan business as specified.7 Chapter 517 additionally
authorizes the denial of the application of a state or federal depository
corporation if the applicant is the subject of any state or federal
1.
See CAL. FIN. CODE § 18003 (West 1989) (defining industrial loan company). See
generally J. Mark Waxman, The Mortgage Banker-IndustrialLoan Company: A New Exempt Lender
6 PAc. L.J. 1 (1975) (providing a historical overview of industrial loan companies in California).
2.
CAL. FiN. CODE § 18100 (West 1989); see L §§ 18000-18999 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992)
(establishing rules and regulations concerning the formation and operation of industrial loan
companies).
3.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25600 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing the powers of the
Department of Corporations and the appointment of the Commissioner).
4.
See CAL. FIN. CODE § 18170 (enacted by Chapter 517) (defining state or federal
depository corporation).
5.
Id. § 18171 (enacted by Chapter 517). The application must be accompanied by a $2000
filing fee. Id § 18172(b) (enacted by Chapter 517); cf. id § 18115 (West 1989) (requiring a $400
filing fee for all other applications to engage in the industrial loan business). See generally Kenneth
E. Scott, Symposium: Striking the Right Balance: Federal and State Regulation of Financial
Industries, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 27 (1987) (suggesting that there are appropriate roles for state and
federal regulation).
6.
CAL FIN. CODE § 18173 (enacted by Chapter 517); see 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1992)
(providing factors to be considered for approval by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). The
Commissioner must investigate the capital, quality of assets, liquidity, and earnings of the corporation
for the previous 36 months and the corporation's history with regard to actions by any regulatory
agency. CAL. FIN. CODE § 18173(a)(1)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 517). The applicant must pay the cost
of any investigation. Id. § 18173(b) (enacted by Chapter 517). The Commissioner may examine any
books, accounts, papers, records and files of the corporation. Id. § 18173(c) (enacted by Chapter 517).
7.
CAL. FIN. CODE § 18117 (West 1989). The Commissioner may deny the application if
public convenience will not be promoted, the proposed capital structure is inadequate, or the company
is being formed for illegitimate purposes. Id § 18117(a)-(c) (West 1989).
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regulatory agency restrictions, 8 or if the assets, 9 capital," liquidity
and earning history of the applicant indicate that the corporation's
potential is inadequate to afford reasonable promise of successful
operation. 1"
Existing law permits any industrial loan company which has been
in operation for more than thirty-six months to apply for
authorization to comply with the capital adequacy requirements of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 12 Chapter 517
permits a state or federal depository corporation which has been in
operation for more than thirty-six months prior to becoming an
to comply with the
industrial loan company to apply for authorization
13
FDIC.
the
of
capital adequacy requirements
LGC

3.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (Supp. 1992) (allowing an appropriate federal banking
agency to issue a cease and desist order to banks engaging in business practices considered unsafe
or unsound). See generally Helen A. Garten, Article, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on
Bank Regulation in a DeregulatoryAge, 57 FORDHAii L. Rnv. 501,576-77 (1989) (suggesting that
regulators should concentrate on management quality and performance records, and use the approval
process as a means of disciplining bank management).

9.
10.
11.

See CAL. FIN. CoDE § 18017 (West 1989) (defining asets).
See i § 18018 (West Supp. 1992) (defining capital).
1&. § 18174(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 517). The Commissioner may, in lieu of denial,

impose any requirements as are necessary for the assets to comply. Id § 18174(c) (enacted by
Chapter 517).
12.

Id. § 18320(d) (West 1989). Compare id. § 18319 (West 1989) (prohibiting an industrial

loan company from having outstanding investment certificates in excess of 20 times its unimpaired
capital) with 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(1)(1) (Supp. 1992) (establishing reserve ratio requirements as
1.25% of insured deposits). See generally CAL. CODE Rnos. tit. 10, § 1151.1 (1990) (providing
application and criteria for increasing certificate ratio).
13.

CAL. FIN. CODE § 18175 (enacted by Chapter 517).
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Commercial Transactions; revision of Divisions 3 and 4
Commercial Code Division 3 (commencing with section
3101) (repealed and new); §§ 4205, 4207, 4211, 4406
(repealed and new); §§ 4106, 4110, 4111, 4208, 4209, 4213
(new); §§ 1201, 1207, 2511, 4101, 4102,4103, 4104, 4105,
4201, 4202,4203,4204,4206,4301,4302,4303,4401,4402,
4403, 4404, 4405, 4407, 4501, 4502, 4503, 4504 (amended);
§§ 4106, 4107,4108,4208,4209, 4210, 4212,4213, 4214
(amended and renumbered); Business and Professions Code
§ 17538.6 (new); Evidence Code § 670 (new).
SB 833 (Beverly); 1992 STAT. Ch. 914
TRUNCATION

Under prior law, for a depository bank' to collect on a check,2
it was required to physically present 3 the check to the payor bank.4
Generally, the payor bank would then send the cancelled check and

1.
See 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1, at 1918 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 4105(a))
(defining depository bank as the first bank that receives an item for collection); cf CAL. COM. CODE
§ 4105(2) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining depository bank as the first bank that receives an item
for collection, unless the item is presented for immediate payment over the counter).
2.
See 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1892 (enacting CAL. COMI. CODE § 3104) (defining
check as a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand); cf CAL. COm. CODE § 3104(f) (repealed
and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining check as a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand, or
as a cashier's check or teller's check). But see WiLLiAM D. HAwKLAND, UNIFORM CoM EMCAL
CODE SERIES, § 4-101:14 (1992) (providing a definition of check as bankers use the term, and
indicating that the § 3104 definition of a check is inadequate because under the present system,
checks must be on a single thickness of paper, payable in United States currency, and must be
payable unconditionally).
3.
See 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1909 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3504(1))
(defining presentment as a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker, acceptor,
drawee, or other payor or on behalf of the holder); cf CAL. COM. CODE § 3501(a) (enacted by
Chapter 914) (redefining presentment).
4.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1, at 1920 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 4204). Prior law
required a collecting bank to send items for presentment by reasonably prompt means to the payor
bank taking various factors into consideration such as any relevant instructions and the nature of the
item. Id.; see 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1909 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3504)(1) (defining
presentment); 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1907 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3501(1)(a))
(providing that a drawer or endorser of a draft not be charged unless presentment for acceptance has
occurred).
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bank statement to the person who wrote the check.5 Chapter 914
permits truncation6 at two points in the check collection process. 7
First, Chapter 914 allows the depository bank to transmit the
information needed by the payor bank in order to charge the
customer/drawer's account by any commercially reasonable means.8
Second, Chapter 914 permits payor bank truncation by allowing a
payor bank to provide only the information in a bank statement
sufficient to allow a customer/drawer to reasonably identify the items
paid, instead of requiring a physical delivery of the check.9

5.
Robert G. Ballen & Paul Homrighausen, Revised Articles 3 and 4: Selected Topics, 24
U.C.C. LJ.3, 22 (1991). The rationale behind the banks forwarding this information was so that the
banks could gain the protections provided to them under § 4406. 1L; see Edward L. Rubin, Policies
and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 43 Bus. LAW. 621, 633 (1988)
(noting that under the prior system, banks would forward the cancelled check to the customer to gain
the protections of § 4406 even though the banks were not required to do so); see also 1963 Cal. Stat.
ch. 819, see. 1, at 1917 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 4104(e)) (defining customer as any person
having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank
carrying an account with another bank); CAL. COM. CODE § 4104(5) (repealed and enacted by
Chapter 914) (providing a virtually identical definition of customer); 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1,
at 1929 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(1)) (providing that a customer's obligation to review his
or her account was not triggered until the cancelled check and a statement has been returned);
HAwKLAD, supra note 2, at § 4-101:14 (explaining that the previous check collection system which
involved multiple handling of checks was inefficient in terms of costs, time involved, and labor
required to process).
6.
See Rubin, supranote 4, at 633 (defining check truncation as any change in the collection
process that shortens the check's physical journey from depository bank to payor bank to customer);
HAWKLAND, supra note 2, at § 4-101:14 (discussing check truncation generally); Ballen &
Homrighausen, supra note 4, at 22-32 (discussing the impact of the revised Uniform Commercial
Code Articles 3 and 4 on check truncation). Truncation is possible at three distinct points in check
collection process. HAwIAND, supra note 2, at § 4-101:14. The first point at which truncation can
occur is at the "first bank" that receives the check. Id. The second point, called "intercept truncation,"
is at an intermediary or "payable through" bank. Id The last point is called "payor bank" truncation.
I, In this scenario, the payor bank would keep the cancelled paper and only send the drawer a
statement describing the drawer's account information. Id.
7.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3501(b)(1) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (permitting
truncation between the depository bank and the payor bank); Id § 4406(a) (repealed and enacted by
Chapter 914) (permitting truncation between the payor bank and the drawer).
8.
Id. § 3501(b)(1) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Chapter 914 provides that
presentment may be made by written, electronic, or oral means. Id Presentment is effective upon
receipt of the demand for payment or upon acceptance. Id
9.
CAL COM. CODE § 4406(a) (amended by Chapter 914). A payor bank need only provide
the customer with a statement describing the item number, amount, and date of payment. Id.; see
Ballen & Homrighausen, supra note 4, at 23 (stating that revised § 4406 only requires payor banks
to provide these three pieces of information because it can be obtained by a bank's computer from
the check's magnetic ink character recognition line (MICR), and thus, no manual examination of the
item is necessary).
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Loss

ALLOCATION

Prior law provided that an unauthorized signature" ° on a
negotiable instrument was wholly inoperative against the person
whose name was signed unless that person ratified it or was
precluded from denying it.1' Under Chapter 914, an unauthorized
signature is ineffective except as the signature of an unauthorized
signer in favor of a person who in good faith pays the instrument or
takes it for value. 2 Chapter 914 further specifies that a drawer13 or
maker 4 can be precluded from asserting a material alteration or
unauthorized signature in various situations as described below.15
The first situation involves someone who impersonates a payee
or a payee's agent and induces an issuer" to issue" an
instrument 8 to the impostor in the name of the payee or the payee's
agent.19 Under prior law, an imposter could not negotiate an
instrument where the imposter impersonated an agent and then
induced the issuer to issue the instrument to the impostor in the name

10.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1, at 1855 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(43)) (defining
unauthorized signature as one made without actual, apparent, or implied authority, and including
forgery); see CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(43) (amended by Chapter 914) (providing an identical
definition of unauthorized signature).
11.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3404). Under prior
law, a person was precluded from denying the unauthorized signature where they were negligent.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1 at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3406).
12.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3403(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). The signature of more
than one person may be required to constitute an authorized signature of an organization. Id §
3403(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). A person who makes an unauthorized signature
which is considered effective may still be civilly or criminally liable. Id § 3403(c) (repealed and
enacted by Chapter 914); see infra note 26 (discussing when the signature of an unauthorized signer
is effective as to a good faith payor).
13.
See CAL. COM. CODE § 3103(a)(3) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining
drawer as a person who signs or identified in a draft as a person ordering payment).
14.
Id § 3103(a)(5) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining maker as a person who
signs or is identified in a note as a person undertaking to pay).
15.
CAL. COM. CODE §§ 3404(a)-(b), 3405(b), 3406(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter914).
16.
Id § 3105(c) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining issuer as a maker or drawer
of an instrument).
17.
Id. § 3105(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining issue as the first delivery
of an instrument by the maker or drawer, whether a holder or not, with the intent of giving rights on
the instrument to someone).
18.
Id § 3104(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining instrument as negotiable
instrument).
19.
CAL. Com. CODE § 3404(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
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of the agent.2 ° Chapter 914, however, permits an imposter to
negotiate an instrument that is issued in the name of either the
impersonated payee or payee's agent.21
The second situation involves employees vested with authority to
draw out instruments who then steal those instruments. 22 Division
3 has divided this situation into two cases.23 The first is where an
employee draws out an instrument payable to a fictious person. 4
Chapter 914 does not change the result in this case.25 The second
case occurs where an employee draws out an instrument payable to
a real person, but the employee has no intention of giving an interest
in the instrument to that person.26 Under prior law, whether an
employer was precluded from asserting fraud depended upon when
the employee formed the intent to steal the check. If the employee
intended to the steal the check before he drew the check out to the
real person, then the employer was precluded.28 If, however, the
employee drew the check out to the real person with the intent that
the person receive an interest in the instrument, and then later formed
the intent to steal the check, the employer was not precluded.29

20.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(1)(a)); see
SELECTED COmmERCIAL STATUTES § 3404, cmt. 1, at 377 (Vest 1992); id., pre-revision article 3 §
3405, cmt. 2, at 103 (West 1992).
21.
CAL COM. CODE § 3404(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATrTES § 3-404, cmt. 1, at 377 (West 1992).
22.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3404(b), 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
23.
Id. § 3404(b), 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED COMMERCIAL
STATuTES § 3-404, cmt. 2, at 377 (West 1992).

24.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3404(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
25.
Compare 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE §3405(l)(b))
(providing that an endorsement by any person in the payee's name is effective in the case where a
person signs an instrument on the drawer's or maker's behalf and has no intention of giving the
payee any interest in the instrument) with CAL. CoM. CODE § 3404(b)(2) (repealed and enacted by
Chapter 914) (providing that any person who endorses the payee's name on an instrument paid or
taken in good faith is effective in the case where the person drawing out the instrument has no
intention of giving the payee any interest in the instrument). The result under either code § is that
an employer is precluded from asserting fraud. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL.
COM. CODE §3405(1)(b)); CAL. COM. CODE § 3404(b)(2) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
26.
CAL COM. CODE § 3404(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
CONMSERC AL STATUTES § 3-404, cmt. 2, at 377 (West 1992).
27.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(1)(b)); see
SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES § 3-404, cmt. 2, at 377 (West 1992).
28.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(l)(b)).
29.
1d; see SELECTED COMMnRCIAL STATUrEs § 3-404, cmt. 2, at 377 (Vest 1992).
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Chapter 914 changes the result where the employee formed the intent
to steal the instrument after the instrument was drawn.30 In this
situation, Chapter 914 specifies that the employer is precluded from
asserting fraud.31
The last situation,32 where a drawer can be precluded, occurs
where a drawer's negligence contributes to a forged signature or
alteration of an instrument.33 Under prior law, an endorsement by
a person in the name of the payee was effective in favor of a good
faith payor even if the drawer did not intend the person identified as
a payee to have an interest.3 Under prior law the payor bank was
entitled to assert the endorsement's effectiveness regardless of the
bank's use of ordinary care.35 Chapter 914 provides that the drawer
may recover the percentage that the bank's failure to use ordinary
care contributed to the loss.3 6 Chapter 914 defines ordinary care as
the observance of reasonable commercial standards in the community

30.
CA. COM. CODE § 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECT
COmmERCIAL STATUTEs § 3-404, cmt. 2, at 377 (West 1992); Id. § 3-405, cmt. 3, at 383.
31.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATuTEs § 3-405, cmt. 3, at 383 (West 1992).
32.
The three situations described are three of the more significant changes that Chapter 914
made. However, there could be other possible situations where Chapter 914 has changed this area
of commercial law.
33.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3406(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
34.
Id. § 3404(b)(2) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see id. § 3405(b) (repealed and
enacted by Chapter 914) (providing that a fraudulent endorsement made by an employee of the
drawer who is entrusted with responsibility with respect to the instrument is effective as to a good
faith payor if the endorsement is made in the name of the person to whom the instrument is payable).
But see hi. § 3420(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (permitting a payee to sue a depository
bank directly for conversion for having taken a check paid with a forged endorsement).
35.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(1)(b)); cf
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Citizen's Bank of Las Cruces, 676 F.2d 1344, 1348 (10th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a bank need not be free from negligence to invoke the protection of UCC 3-405). But
see Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 696, 582 P.2d 920, 937, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 346 (1978) (permitting common law negligence action against a bank which negligently
accepted a check with an unauthorized endorsement). See generally Bryan D. Hull, Common Law
Negligence and Check FraudLoss Allocation: Has Common Law Supplemented or Supplanted the
UCC?, 51 Owo ST. LJ. 605 (1990) (discussing checkfraud cases decided on common law principals
and when courts should rely on those principals).
36.
CAL. CoM. CODE §§ 3406(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see James Bailey,
Comment, Allocation of Loss for Forged Checks Under Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. and the
ProposedRevisions Thereto, 22 PAC. LJ. 1263,1294 (1991) (suggesting that the effect of the U.C.C.
revision is to limit some of the harsh results under prior law).
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in which the bank is located.37 Thus, if a person's negligence causes
a fraudulent check to be issued, and the payor bank is negligent in
paying that check, the loss will be allocated between the two parties
based upon their respective amount of fault."
Under prior law, some courts required that an endorsement be in
the exact name of the payee in order to act as a preclusion against the
negligent drawer or maker.39 Chapter 914 provides that a negligent
drawer or maker is precluded if the endorsement is substantially
similar to the name of the payee, or the instrument, with or without
an endorsement, is deposited in a depository bank.40
Chapter 914 further provides for the allocation of the burden of
proof between parties.4 ' Chapter 914 specifies that the party
asserting the preclusion has the burden of proving that the loss was
caused by the other party's negligence. 42 For example, if a plaintiff
is trying to prove that the defendant payor bank failed to use ordinary
care in paying a fraudulent check and that such failure contributed to
the loss, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the payor bank's
43
negligence.
Under existing law, every contract or duty within the scope of the
California Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance. 44 Chapter 914 further defines good faith, as used
37.
CAL. Com. CODE § 3103(a)(7) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Reasonable
commercial standards do not require a bank, which processes instruments through automated means,
to examine the instrument if such failure to examine does not violate the bank's established
procedures. Id; see Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 293 (Ist
Cir. 1988) (holding that evidence that a bank used practices considered reasonable in the area was
prima facie evidence of ordinary care); see also American Sec. Bank v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
538 A.2d 736,741 (D.C. 1988) (holding that a bank which failed to follow its own highly meticulous
practices failed to use ordinary care even though its practices were much more stringent than
practices used by other banks in the area).
38.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3406 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
COgmmRCIAL STATUTES § 3-406, cmt. 4, at 386 (West 1992).
39.
See SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES § 3-404, cmt. 1, at 377 (West 1992) (noting that
some courts had interpreted former § 3405(1)(a)-(b) as requiring endorsement in the exact name of
the payee in order to preclude a negligent drawer or maker).
40.
CAL. CoM. CODE § 3404(c) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
41.
Id. § 3406(c) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
42.
IH
43.
IH
44.
Id. § 1203 OVest 1964). Compare id. § 1201(19) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining
good faith in general) with id. § 3103(a)(4) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining good
faith with respect to Division 3 of the Commercial Code).
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in Divisions 3 and 4, as honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.45
Prior law provided that an employer was liable for losses
incurred in padded payroll situations46 where an employer's agent
or employee prepared instruments for signature or gave the signing
officer the name of the payee.4 7 Chapter 914 provides that an
employer is responsible 48 for losses incurred as a result of an
employee's fraudulent endorsement of an employer's check if the
employer entrusted the employee with the power of handling the
employer's check.49 Chapter 914 further provides that an employer
may escape liability for an employee's fraudulent endorsement if the
employer did not entrust the employee with the authority to care for

45.
l § 3103(a)(4) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); id. § 4104(c) (amended by
Chapter 914); cf. id. § 2103(l)(b) (West 1964) (defiming good faith in the case of a merchant as
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards); Ballen & Homrighausen,
supra note 4, at 10 (suggesting that the reasonable commercial standards definition only applies to
sections of Divisions 3 and 4 which specifically call for good faith, whereas all other sections
continue to be subject to the general good faith requirement as defined in Division 1). See generally
Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 527 (Mo. App. 1986) (finding that
early drafts and versions of the Uniform Commercial Code contained a general definition of good
faith which was a subjective standard while the definition incorporated into later versions has required
an objective standard).
46.
See Danje Fabrics Div. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 409 N.Y.S. 2d 565, 567 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978) (defining padded payroll situations as instances where a drawer's agent or employee
prepares the checks, presumably drawn for the payroll, for signature by furnishing the signing officer
with the name of the payee).
47.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. CoM. CODE § 3405(l)(c)); see
Danje Fabrics,409 N.Y.S. 2d at 568 (holding that an employee did not supply the employer with
the names of the payee where the payees were bona fide creditors of the employer and payees had
submitted invoices for work performed to the employer).
48.
See CAL- COM. CODE § 3405(a)(3) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining
responsibility). Chapter 914 changes the definition of responsbility to include employer-employee
relationships that the employer can obtain insurance coverage for by purchasing employee fidelity
bonds. SELECTED COMimERCAL STATUTES § 3-405, cmt. 1, at 381 (West 1992).
49.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see Donald J. Rapson,
Loss Allocation in Forgeryand FraudCases: Significant Changes under Revised Articles 3 & 4,42
ALA. L. REV. 435 (1991) (stating that the rationale for placing the loss on the employer is that the
employer is in a much better position to avoid the loss by exercising care in choosing its employees,
supervising them, developing procedures to avoid fraudulent acts by its employees, and by insuring
itself against this type of loss); see also Danje Fabrics,409 N.Y.S. 2d at 569 (holding that drawee
bank was liable where an employee fraudulently endorsed payees' names on checks and the employee
did not supply the employer with the payees' names); Snug Harbor Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Toms River, 253 A.2d 581, 582 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that a bank could be held liable
under U.C.C. § 3405 where the employee fraudulently endorsed the payees' names and deposited the
checks in his own account).
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the employer's check, the bank handling the check failed to exercise
ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument, or the bank did not
act in good faith.5"
Under prior law, where an employer's name was fraudulently
endorsed on instruments made payable to an employer, the employer
was responsible for any loss incurred if the loss was caused by the
employer's negligence.5 1 Chapter 914 imposes liability on the
employer for losses resulting from fraudulent endorsements whether
or not the employer was negligent."
Under prior law, a negligent drawer or maker was precluded from
asserting a forgery or lack of authority against a holder in due
course.53 Prior law further precluded a negligent drawer or maker
from bringing a cause of action against a party who contributed to the
loss by failing to exercise ordinary care in taking or paying the
instrument. 54 Chapter 914 changes this result by expanding the class

50.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Section 3405 covers
employer-employee relationships that were not covered under former U.C.C. § 3405(1)(c). SELECTED
CONlERCIAl STATUTES § 3-405, cmt. 2, at 381 (West 1992). In particular, Chapter 914 includes
independent contractors as employees. CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(1) (repealed and enacted by Chapter
914). Chapter 914 favors employers more than former U.C.C. § 3405 did since it makes banks
responsible for losses caused by the banks' negligence. SELEcTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES § 3-405,
cmt. 2, at 381 (West 1992). When California adopted Chapter 914, it deleted the word "substantially"
from the provisions relating to a party's contributory negligence. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3405(b) (1991); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, para. 3-405(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992); KAN. U.C.C. ANN. § 84-3405(b) (1991) (providing that the person who bears the loss can recover against a person who
substantially contributed to the loss) with CAL. CoM. CODE § 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by
Chapter 914) (providing that the person who bears the loss can recover against a parson who
contributed to the loss).
51.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL CoM. CODE § 3406).
52.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3405(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATUTES § 3-405, cmt. 1, at 381 (West 1992) (explaining that § 3-405 imposes the
loss on the employer without proof of negligence).
53.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3406); see id., see.
1, at 1900 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3302) (defining holder in due course); see CAL. CoM. CODE
§ 3302 (amended by Chapter 914) (redefining holder in due course).
54.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1903 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3406). The drawer
is precluded from asserting the forgery against a good faith payor if the drawer's lack of ordinary
care substantially contributes to the making of the forged signature. IL; see CAL COI. CODE §
3 103(a)(7) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining ordinary care); Ed Stin Chevrolet, Inc.
v. National City Bank, 503 N.E.2d 524, 530 (Ohio 1986) (stating that the risk of loss is allocated to
the party in the best position to avoid the loss); Annotation, Commercial Paper: What Amounts to
"Negligence Contributingto Alteration or UnauthorizedSignature" Under UCC § 3.406,67 A.L.R.
3d 144, 151 (1975) (suggesting that a causal connection must exist between the drawer's negligence
and the loss). Compare Chicago Heights Sec. Exch. v. Par Steel Prods., 463 N.E.2d 829, 830 (Ill.
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of instruments covered by the provision to include all instruments as
opposed to drafts only.55 Chapter 914 also expands the class of
people protected by the rule to cover any holder as opposed to
holders in due course only. 6 Thus, if a drawer's or maker's
negligence contributes to a material alteration of an instrument or
lack of authority for a signed instrument, the maker or drawer is
precluded from asserting the material alteration or lack of authority
against any holder. 7
FAIuRE To REViEw STATEMENTS

Existing law precludes a drawer who does not examine his or her
statement of account 58 within a reasonable time from asserting that
certain payments were unauthorized.59 Under prior law, the drawer
was precluded from asserting an unauthorized signature against the
bank so long as the bank exercised reasonable carer ° Under Chapter
914, if both the drawer and the party asserting the preclusion fail to
6
use ordinary care, the loss must be allocated between the two. '

App. 1984) (holding that the drawer owes no duty to hire honest employees) with Commercial Credit
Equip. Corp. v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 636 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the drawer was negligent in hiring a dishonest employee). See generally Rapson, supra note 43,
at 459 (comparing loss allocation under former and revised UCC Articles 3 and 4 in specific
scenarios of check fraud).
55.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3406(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATUTES § 3-406, cmt. 1, at 384 (West 1992).
56.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3406(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED
COfNERCiAL STATUTES § 3-406, cmt. 1, at 384 (West 1992).
57.
SELECTED COMNMERCIAL STATUTES § 3-406, cmt. 1, at 385 (West 1992).
58.
See CAL. COM. CODE § 4104(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining account).
59.
l § 4406(d) (amended by Chapter 914). If the drawer does not report the unauthorized
payment with reasonable promptness, the drawer is precluded from asserting the signature is
unauthorized if the bank proves that it suffered a loss. Id. § 4406(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 914).
The drawer is additionally precluded from asserting any forgery or alteration by the same wrongdoer
on any other item paid in good faith by the bank before receiving notice and after the drawer has had
a reasonable time to inspect the statement. Il § 4406(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 914). Compare
CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 914) (providing that a reasonable period of time
is not to exceed 30 days) with U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b) (West 1964) (providing that a reasonable period
of time is not to exceed 14 days).
60.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1929 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(b)(2)).
61.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3406(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); id. § 4406(e)
(amended by Chapter 914). The loss must be allocated according to the extent to which each party's
failure to use ordinary care contributed to the loss. Id. See generally Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d
804, 813, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1975) (introducing comparative negligence
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AccoRD AND SATISFACTION

Existing case law provides that if a debtor,62 whose debt is the
subject of an honest dispute, sends a payment on the express
condition that acceptance63 will constitute full payment, acceptance
by the creditor' is settlement of the debt even if the creditor notifies
the debtor of the intention to accept only as a payment on account. 65
Chapter 914 provides that if the condition is written and
conspicuous,66 and subject to good faith dispute, acceptance by the
creditor is an accord and satisfaction. 67 Chapter 914 additionally
provides that a creditor may avoid application of accord and
satisfaction under specified circumstances.68

principles in which damages are allocated according to percentage of fault); Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal.
4th 339, 342, 834 P.2d 724, 726, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 32 (1992) (following the California Supreme
Court's decision in Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 314, 834 P.2d 696, 707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2,
13-14 (1992) regarding reasonable assumption of the risk); Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 314, 834 P,2d at
707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14 (holding that reasonable assumption of the risk is still tie standard
and can still be used as a complete bar to negligence actions); Glenn S. Hansen, The Double

Preclusion of U.C.C. Section 3-406: Duties of Care and Reasonable Commercial Standards, 32
DRAKE L. REv. 179 (1983) (discussing the use of contributory negligence under prior law when both
parties failed to use ordinary care).
62.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (6th ed. 1990) (defining debtor).
63.
See CAl. COM. CODE § 3409(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining
acceptance).
64.
See id. § 1201(12) (amended by Chapter 914) (defiing creditor).
65.
Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 597, 234 P.2d 16, 18 (1951);
Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 60, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439
(1982). This standard applies even if the debtor only sends the amount due at the time. Potter, 37
Cal. 2d at 602, 234 P.2d at 21. See generally I B.E. WnYiN, SUM ARY OF CALIPORNIA LAW,
Contracts §'900 (1987) (discussing accord and satisfaction); cf CAL. CIv. CODE § 1526(a) (West
Supp. 1992) (providing that accord and satisfaction has not occurred where a party accepts a check
tendered by a debtor in full discharge of claim with the words "payment in full" noted on the back
of the check).
66.
See CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(10) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining conspicuous).
67.
Id § 331 l(a)-(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
68.
Id § 3311(c) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). If an organization has sent a
conspicuous statement to debtors asserting that communications concerning disputed debts must be
sent to a specified address and the check was not sent to that place, the claim is not discharged. Id.
§ 3311(c)(1) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). The debt is not discharged if the claimant
tenders repayment of the instrument within 90 days after payment. Id. § 3311 (c)(2) (repealed and
enacted by Chapter 914); see id. § 1201(28) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining organization); see
also Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 61, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436,
439 (1982) (upholding the rule in Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., but only applying it where
there is a bona fide dispute between the parties). Compare Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fl.
App. Ct. 1978) (holding that a creditor who cashed a check over disputed debts, where the check
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PAYMENT ON A POSTDATED CHECK

Under prior law a payor bank was not permitted to charge a
customer's account for a postdated check before the stated date on
the check because the check was not properly payable. 69 Chapter
914 permits a bank to immediately charge a customer's account when
a postdated check is paid early unless the customer gives notice to the
bank of the postdating."0
STOP PAYMENT

Under prior law, there were no express provisions regarding stop
payments as they relate to teller's or cashier's checks. Under Chapter
914, a customer who buys a teller's or cashier's check has no right to
stop payment. 7 Chapter 914 further provides that if an obligated
bank wrongfully refuses to pay a dishonored teller's check, the
person who tries to enforce the check can receive consequential

contained words on it stating that cashing it constituted full satisfaction over disputed amounts, did
not waive any rights with respect to the disputed amounts) with Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors,
407 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1981) (holding that a creditor who cashed check in full
satisfaction of all disputed obligations could not reserve her rights as to any of the disputed debts by
expressly noting on the cheek that she was reserving her rights on the disputed amount). See
generally Paula G. Walter, The Rise and Fallof U.C.C. Section 1-207 and The Full Payment Check - Checkmate?, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 81, 106 (1987) (stating that controversy over U.C.C. § 1-207
has effectively created two views of accord and satisfaction, and thus, practitioners should determine
which view their jurisdiction follows).
69.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. I, at 1927 (enacting CAL. CoM. CODE § 4401); cf CAL. COM.
CODE § 3113(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (providing that the date stated on a negotiable
instrument determines the time of payment).
70.
CAL. COM. CODE § 4401(c) (amended by Chapter 914). The notice must describe the
check with reasonable certainty and afford the bank reasonable time to act. Id If a bank charges the
account for the check after notice has been given and before the date stated, the bank is liable for
resulting damages. Id The notice remains effective for six months, and may thereafter be renewed.
Id; see id § 4402(b) (amended by Chapter 914) (establishing the liability of a bank for wrongful
dishonor of a properly payable item); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.6(a) (enacted by
Chapter 914) (prohibiting any business from requiring a customer to issue a postdated check unless
the customer is given written advice that the cheek could be cashed immediately and the advice is
acknowledged by the customer in writing).
71.
CAL COM. CODE § 4403(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Comment 3 to § 4403
explains that a customer has no right to stop payment on a cashier's or teller's check since the check
is not drawn on the customer's account. SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES § 4-403, cmt. 3, at 466
(West 1992). Thus, the customer does not fall under § 4-403(a) which allows a customer to stop
payment on any item drawn on the customer's account. Id
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damages if the obligated bank is first notified of the circumstances
creating the damages.7 2
Chapter 914 requires an obligated bank7" to issue a replacement

check or supply a refund to a claimant7 4 who has provided a
declaration of loss7" when the claim is asserted or ninety days after
the date of the original check, whichever is later. 6
COLLECTION OF ITEMS

Chapter 914 permits a depository bank 77 to become a holder of
a cheek whether or not the customer has endorsed the check. 78
Chapter 914 additionally provides that the person who encodes a
magnetic ink character recognition (ICR) 79 amount on a check is

liable for misencoding the amount if it is less than or greater than the
amount that was to be encoded.80

72.
CAL COM. CODE § 3411(b)(3) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
73.
See i § 3312(a)(4) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining obligated bank).
74.
See i § 3312(a)(2) (repealed and enacted by Chapter914) (defining claimant with respect
to § 3312).
75.
See id § 3312(a)(3) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining declaration of loss).
76.
Id § 3312(b)(1) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). The claimant must provide
identification if requested and the communication containing the declaration must describa the check
with reasonable certainty and afford the bank reasonable time to act on the matter. Id § 3312(b)
(repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Payment within 90 days of the original date of the check to
the person entitled to enforce the check discharges the bank of any liability. ld § 3312(b)(2)
(repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see id § 3301 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914)
(defining person entitled to enforce the check); see also Ballen & Homrighausen, supra note 4, at
16 (suggesting that banks previously required an indemnity bond as a condition to issuance of a
replacement check).
77.
See CAL COM. CODE § 4105(2) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining depository bank).
78.
See it § 4205(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Compare Bowling Green, Inc.
v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1970) (providing that a bank can be a
holder on checks that have not been endorsed) with United Overseas Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 596, 602 (D. Md. 1973) (ruling that a bank becomes a holder when it receives an item that has
been endorsed or when the bank adds its depositor's endorsement to the item it received).
79.
See HAwKLAND, supra note 2, at § 4-101:14 (discussing the technical aspects of how
checks encoded with MICR numbers are transmitted through the system).
80.
CAL. COM. CODE § 4209(a) (enacted by Chapter 914); see Port City State Bank v.
American Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196,201 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that where a check for $72 dollars
was encoded for $72,000, the drawee is not liable until it accepts or pays the instrument); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Fidelity Bank, Nat'l Assn, 724 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that
where a payor bank paid only $10,000 on a $100,000 check due to an encoding error, the payor bank
was not liable to the depository bank because the encoder was estopped from claiming more than the
encoded amount).
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TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION

Under prior law, a holder could not sue on an instrument81
where the holder knew a fiduciary8 2 had negotiated8 3 the
instrument for his or her personal benefit or breached his or her
fiduciary duty.84 However, prior law did not preclude a holder from
becoming a holder in due course just because the holder was aware
that a fiduciary relationship existed.85 Chapter 914 clarifies prior
law by specifying when a taker is subject to a claim on an
instrument.8 6 In particular, Chapter 914 provides that a taker is
subject to a claim on an instrument where the taker has knowledge87
that a fiduciary has a duty to a represented person,88 and the
fiduciary has deposited an instrument drawn on the represented
person's account made out to the fiduciary. 9 Conversely, Chapter

81.
See CAL. COM. CODE § 3104(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining
instrument as a negotiable instrument); see U. § 3104(e) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914)
(specifying when an instrument is a note and when an instrument is a draft).
82.
See L § 3307(a)(1) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining fiduciary as an agent,
trustee, partner, corporate officer or director, or other representative owing a fiduciary duty with
respect to an instrument).
83.
See i. § 320 1(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining negotiation as a transfer
of possession of an instrument).
84.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1900 (enacting CAL. CoM. CODE § 3304(2)).
85.
Ia , sec. 1, at 1900 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3304(4)(e)).
86.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3307(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see id. § 3104
(repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining instrument as a negotiable instrument). Chapter 914
specifies that a taker cannot be a holder in due course where a taker has notice of a claim to an
instrument. Id § 3302(a)(2)(e) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see id. § 3306 (repealed and
enacted by Chapter 914) (specifying when a person can be subject to a claim on an instrument).
87.
See id. § 1201(25)(c) (amended by Chapter 914) (defining knowledge). Existing law
provides that the taker's knowledge has to be actual knowledge, or that given the totality of
circumstances, the taker should have been put on notice. I . § 1201(25)(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter
914).
88.
See id. § 3307(a)(2) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining represented person
as principal, beneficiary, partnership, corporation, or other person to whom the duty stated in
3307(a)(1) is owed).
89.
Id § 3307(b)(2) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). The rationale behind section
3307(b)(2) is that it is not within the normal course of business for a fiduciary to deposit to the
fiduciary's personal account an instrument made out to the represented person and endorsed by the
fiduciary. SELEcrED CoMMERClAL STATUTES § 3-307, cmt. 3, at 357 (West 1992). Compare Smith
v. Olympic Bank, 693 P.2d 92, 95 (Wash. 1985) (holding that a bank was placed on notice that a
fiduciary breached his duty where a father received a life insurance check as guardian to a minor,
endorsed the check as guardian, and deposited it in his personal account) with In re Knox, 477
N.E.2d 448, 451 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a bank was not on notice where a guardian placed assets
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914 provides that where the fiduciary has authority to write checks
on the represented person's account and the fiduciary writes an
instrument out to the fiduciary personally, the taker is not put on
notice.9"
Under prior law, a buyer's obligation was discharged on the
instrument and on the underlying obligation where a holder had a
check certified. 91 In this case, while prior law permitted the holder
92
to sue the certifying bank on the acceptor's contract for payment,
the holder had no right of recourse against the drawer on the
underlying obligation or on the instrument. 93 Furthermore, prior law
provided that where the check was not certified, the holder's right of
recourse against the drawer on the instrument was suspended until the
instrument came due, or until presentment in the case where the
instrument was payable on demand.94 If the instrument was
dishonored, then the holder could sue the drawer on the instrument
or the underlying obligation. 95 Under Chapter 9 14, it does not
matter who has the check certified because a drawer is discharged
when a bank accepts the check.96 Chapter 914 further provides that
where a certified check, 97 cashier's check, 98 or teller's check99 is

of a minor into the guardian's personal bank account); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 1973) (holding that a brokerage
did not meet the actual knowledge requirement under U.C.C. § 1201(25) to be placed on notice
where the brokerage simply received a check in payment of a transaction for the personal account
of corporate officer who paid for brokerage services with a corporate check).
90.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3307(b)(3) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). The rationale for
not placing the taker on notice in this situation is that this is not an unusual type of transaction.
SELECTED COMMCiAl.L STATuTES § 3-307, cnt. 4, at 357 (West 1992).
91.
1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1904 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3802(l)(a)).
92.
See id, see. 1, at 1906 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3413(a)). Section 3413 provided that
an acceptor agrees to pay the instrument). Id
93.
Id
94.
Id, see. 1, at 1915 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3802(1)(b)).
95.
Id.
96.
CAL. COM. CODE § 3414(c) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
97.
See id § 3409(d) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining certified check as a
check accepted by a bank upon which the check is drawn).
98.
See id § 3104(g) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining cashier's check as a
draft in which the drawer and drawee are the same bank).
99.
See id.§ 3104(h) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining teller's check as a draft
drawn by one bank on another bank or payable at another bank).
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furnished as payment for an obligation, the obligation is discharged,
unless there is an agreement to the contrary."
Chapter 914 expands the scope of Division 3 to include situations
where a check given to a payee is stolen, the payee's name is forged,
' In this case, Chapter 914
and the forger receives payment. 01
provides that the drawer's obligation is suspended on the underlying
obligation because a forger cannot be a holder in due course, and
therefore the payor bank did not pay a holder. 102 If the payor bank
pays a forger, the underlying obligation continues to be
suspended.1" 3 Thus, the payee can attempt to obtain the amount due
on the instrument either through a cause of action in conversion
against the bank"0 4 or against the drawer. 10 5
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
06
Prior law specified when various causes of action accrued. 1
Chapter 914 specifies the statute of limitations that apply under

Division 3 in various actions to enforce a party's obligations on an
l § 3310(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Under former U.C.C. section
100.
3802(l)(a), if there was a right of recourse, then the obligation could not be discharged. SmcTE
COMwERCiAL STATUTES § 3-310, cmt. 2, at 361 (West 1992). However, under Chapter 914, the
obligation is discharged while a right of recourse is retained. kl Under prior law, teller's checks and
cashier's checks were not expressly defined. Compare 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, see. 1, at 1892
(enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3104) (defining certified check, but providing no definition for either
teller's check or cashier's check) with CAL. COM. CODE § 3104(g), (h) (repealed and enacted by
Chapter 914) (providing definitions for cashier's check and teller's check); id. § 3409(d) (repealed
and enacted by Chapter 914) (defining certified check). However, Chapter 914 expressly defines these
types of instruments. Id. § 3104(g)-(h) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
101. Compare 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. 1, at 1915 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3310) with
CAL. COM. CODE § 3310(b)(4) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914); see SELECTED CONMERCIAL
STATUTES § 3-310, cmt. 4, at 361 (West 1992).
102. CAL. COM. CODE § 3310(b)(4) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
103. Id. § 3602(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
104. l § 3420 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Section 3420 provides that an action
in conversion exists where a person not entitled to enforce the instrument takes the instrument and
receives payment for it. IL § 3420(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
105. l § 3309(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Section 3309 provides that where
a payee's check is stolen, the payee can still enforce the instrument. Id. § 3309(a) (repealed and
enacted by Chapter 914). Under § 3414, the drawer's obligation is triggered due to dishonor resulting
from the unpaid cheek. Il § 3414(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).
106. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819, sec. I, at 1896 (enacting CAL. COM. CODE § 3122) (specifying
the time at which a cause of action accrued against a maker or acceptor, the obligor of a demand or
time certificate of deposit, and a drawer of a draft or an endorser of any instrument).
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instrument to pay the instrument, or where conversion or warranty is
at issue.107
TRF/LGC
Commercial Transactions; telephone solicitations
Business and Professions Code §§ 17539.5, 17539.55,
17539.6 (new).
AB 2746 (Speier); 1992 STAT. Ch. 944
Existing law requires telephonic sellers' to register with the State
Attorney General.2 Existing law further requires telephonic sellers
to disclose specified information3 to potential buyers, and forbids
telephonic sellers from engaging in specified unlawful activities.4

107. CAL. COM. CODE § 3118 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). Listed below are some
examples of these statutes of limitation. In actions where a party is enforcing the obligation of
another party to pay a note payable at a definite time, the statute of limitations is six years from the
due date or dates stated in the note. Il § 3118(a) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). In actions
involving notes payable on demand, the statute of limitations for bringing a cause of action to enforce
the demand is within six years from the time that demand for payment was made to the maker. Id.
§ 3118(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914). In the case of a breach of warranty or conversion
of an instrument for money had and received, the statute of limitations is three years from when the
cause of action accrues. L § 3118(g) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 914).

1.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.1 (West 1987) (defining telephonic seller as a
person who causes or attempts to cause a telephone solicitation to o.cur either by his own efforts,
by sales people, or by automatic dialing machines).
2.
Id. § 17511.6 (West 1987). See CAL. CONST. art V, § 21 (defining the duties of the
Attorney General).
3.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17511.5 (West 1987) (requiring telephonic sellers to
inform prospective purchasers of such things as the seller's complete name and address).
4.
IL Section 17511.7 prohibits telephonic sellers from mentioning to prospective purchasers
that the seller must comply with various requirements relating to telephonic sellers such as telling
the purchaser of the seller's complete name and address. Id.§ 17511.7 (Vest 1987). Section 17511.8
further prohibits telephonic sellers from soliciting prospective purchasers unless the sellers are
registered with the Department of Justice. let § 17511.8 (West 197). Section 17511.9 prohibits
anyone from wilfully violating any provision relating to telephonic sellers, or from engaging in a
business practice involving a telephonic seller that would constitute fraud or deception. Id. § 17511.9
(West 1987).
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Under Chapter 944, information providers 5 are prohibited from
engaging in specified activities6 if the activities are designed to
solicit7 callers' to use an information-access service. 9 Additionally,
Chapter 944 requires information providers to disclose specified
information" in all advertisements. 1 Chapter 944 prohibits
information providers from engaging in certain activities if their
business involves a sweepstakes, 12 unless they comply with

5.
See Ht. § 17539.5(a)(5) (enacted by Chapter 944) (defining information provider as a
person who sells or advertises for his or her own benefit an information-access service). An
information-access service is a telecommunications service which charges users more than the
standard cost of transmitting the call to access the service's telephone number. I. § 17539.5(a)(6)
(enacted by Chapter 944).
6.
See IU. § 17539.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 944) (specifying prohibited activities). Chapter
944 forbids the following: (1) Using automatic dialing devices or a live or recorded outbound
telephone message; (2) using signals or tones provided by the telephone solicitation service to access
the information-access service; (3) using one telephone number to connect callers directly with a 900
number, (4) referring a caller from one 900 number to another, (5) requiring callers to call more than
one 900 in order to receive goods or services; (6) advertising that the information-access service is
free; and (7) advertising in such a way that implies the ad came from such entities as the government,
a public utility, or insurance company. IM.
7.
See ki § 17539.5(a)(I 1) (enacted by Chapter 944) (defining solicitation).
8.
See i& § 17539.5(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 944) (defining caller).
9.
Id. § 17539.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 944); see SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 2746,
at 2-3 (Aug. 10, 1992) (stating that the apparent reason for implementing this law is to prevent
fraudulent and misleading practices involving the use of "900" numbers, particularly those "900"
numbers which involve contest, sweepstake, investment, credit card, and job referral scams).
10. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17539.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 944) (specifying
information required to be disclosed). Chapter 944 requires information providers to disclose the
following: (1) A description of the information-access service; (2) the information provider's name,
address, and non-900 telephone number, (3) the cost of the call to be calculated depending on the
type of information-access service provided; and (4) for information-access services likely to attract
callers under the age of 18, a warning that children should obtain parental consent before using the
service. Ma.; cf ILL. STAT. ch. 134, para. 160A (1992) (mandating that telecommunications carriers
who provide pay-per-call telephone information services furnish the name, address, and telephone
number of the actual provider of the information service); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1731 (West 1992)
(specifying that advertisements for telecommunications services must state the cost of calling the
service); ARz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2920 (West 1991) (providing that an information access
telephone service provider must state the cost of each call). Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated §
13-2920 additionally requires information access telephone service providers to: (1) reimburse the
telephone carriers for any costs incurred associated with blocking the information access service; (2)
arrange with telephone carriers to make a one time fee adjustment for telephone calls made to the
information access service by minors who call the service without authorization or involve fraudulent
calls; and (3) restrict any sexually explicit information access services to persons over the age of
eighteen. Id
11.
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17539.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 944).
12.
See id. § 17539.5(a)(12) (enacted by Chapter 944) (defining sweepstakes).
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specified provisions.13 Under Chapter 944, any information provider
who operates an information-access service that involves a
sweepstakes is required to register with the Department of Justice and
provide the Department with certain information. 14 Last, Chapter
944 provides that any advertisement for a 900 number, whether
broadcast or in print, be written or spoken in the same language that
the 900 number uses in its recorded messages or with live
operators."5
TRF

13.
Id § 17539.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 944). Chapter 944 requires information providers to
comply with a variety of requirements if their information-access services engage in a sweepstakes.
IL These requirements include providing a free-alternative method of entering the sweepstakes that
is prominently disclosed on all solicitations, prohibiting minors from participating, and making a list
available of all winners of major prizes to anyone who asks for the list. l
14.
Id § 17539.55(a) (enacted by Chapter 944); see i. § 17539.55(b) (enacted by Chapter
944) (requiring that the registration contain specified information). Chapter 944 specifies that
information providers must furnish the Department of Justice with such information as each 900
number used in the sweepstakes, the information provider's name, address, and corporate identity,
a copy of the sweepstakes rules, and copies of each type of solicitation that the information provider
has used. Id
15.
Id § 17539.6 (enacted by Chapter 944).
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